Anmol Mukhia

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Climate change
two-level game
neo-classical realism
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China’s two-level game in the climate change negotiation

Author : Anmol mukhia

Keyword : Climate change, two-level game, neo-classical realism, ratification game, environmental hazard

Subject : Social sciences

Article Type : Original article (research)

DOI : 10.4324/9780429507496

Article File : Full Text PDF

Abstract : Why is China more concerned about ‘Climate Change’ when the developed nation is moving backward in negotiation? Where does China stand in the Climate Change negotiation? Climate Change as one of the crucial issue have hit the developing countries like China, where the focus is on the environmental dilemma - carbon technology to be used for further development or to compromise with the protocol called by the Climate Change regime. As Beijing was listed one of the polluted city in 2015 due to its smog blanket. So China cannot escape from its day to day facing climate change issues. However, China came up with the innovative idea at the Paris Climate talks in Nov 2015 with the commitment of cutting power sector emissions to 60 per cent by 2020. China says it will cut Co2 emissions from coal power by 180 tons by 2020. Moreover, leaders like Le Keqiang say that the policies of state have to change from ‘war on terror’ to the ‘war on pollution’. Theoretically, Neo-classical Realism explains that states are still dominant according to its domestic capabilities in international system. Robert Putnam’s two-level game explains at the national level domestic groups pursue their interest by pressuring the government to adopt favourable policies and politicians seek power by constructing coalition among groups. At the international level, national government seek to maximise its own ability to satisfy domestic pressure while minimising the adverse consequences of foreign development. In case of China the domestic game is a ‘ratification game’, where the contribution does not exceed those in a benchmark without domestic constraints. Thus, the chapter uses the process of tracing method by tracing the links between possible causes and observe outcomes focusing on sequential processes.

Article by : Anmol Mukhia

Article add date : 2020-11-24


How to cite : Anmol mukhia. (2020-November-24). China’s two-level game in the climate change negotiation. retrieved from https://openacessjournal.com/abstract/372